The United Kingdom's Science and Technology Strategy for -

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1 The United Kingdoms Science and Technology Strategy for Countering International Terrorism August 2009

2 The United Kingdoms Science and Technology Strategy for Countering International Terrorism August 2009

3 Crown Copyright 2009 The text in this document (excluding the Royal Arms and other departmental or agency logos) may be reproduced free of charge in any format or medium providing it is reproduced accurately and not used in a misleading context. The material must be acknowledged as Crown copyright and the title of the document specified. Where we have identified any third party copyright material you will need to obtain permission from the copyright holders concerned. ISBN: 978-1-84726-938-6 The United Kingdoms Science and Technology Strategy for Countering International Terrorism

4 Contents The United Kingdoms Science and Technology Strategy for Countering International Terrorism Ministerial foreword: Admiral the Lord West of Spithead 4 Executive summary 5 Part 1 Strategic context 7 International terrorism the threat to the UK 7 Strategic factors 7 Planning assumptions 7 CONTEST: aim and principles 8 CONTEST: science and technology 8 CONTEST: governance of science and technology 9 The impact of future technology on counter-terrorism 10 Part 2 The 2009 Science and Technology Strategy 13 Part 3 Delivering the strategy 15 Horizon scanning 15 Identifying and sharing requirements; delivering effective solutions 16 International collaboration 21 Part 4 Key challenges in counter-terrorism 25 Key challenges 25 Case studies 28 Conclusion 32 End notes 33 Contents

5 Executive summary The UK and UK interests overseas face The strategy has three principle aserious threat from international objectives: terrorism. The UK Governments response To use horizon scanning to to the threat is set out in CONTEST, a understand future scientific and three-year counter-terrorist strategy. technical threats and opportunities and inform our decision making on CONTEST is based on planning counter-terrorism. assumptions about the future direction ofthe threat and a set of core principles, To ensure the development and notably the protection of human rights. delivery of effective counter-terrorism Ithas four main workstreams (Pursue, solutions by identifying and sharing Prevent, Protect and Prepare). priority science and technology requirements. Science and technology play a key part in To enhance international counter-terrorism, including our ability to collaboration on counter-terrorism pursue terrorists, prevent radicalisation, related science and technology. protect essential services and infrastructure and prepare for a The strategy explains what has been terroristattack. achieved under each of these objectives since 2007 and the priorities for the next This document updates the 2007 Science three years. and Innovation Strategy for Security and Counter-terrorism. Its aim is to: use The strategy also identifies some of the innovation, science and technology to key counter-terrorist challenges that we reduce the risk to the UK and its interests need to address in the next few years overseas from international terrorism, so and where science and technology are that people can go about their lives freely likely to be vital. The challenges include: and with confidence. Understanding the causes of radicalisation. Protecting the national infrastructure. Reducing the vulnerability of crowded places. Protecting against cyber terrorism. Improving analytical tools. Identifying, detecting and countering novel and improvised explosives. Understanding and countering Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Explosive (CBRNE) threats. Executive summary

6 The United Kingdoms Science and Technology Strategy for Countering International Terrorism

7 Part 1 Strategic context International terrorism the threat Strategic factors tothe UK 1.04 The revised CONTEST strategy 1.01 The 2009 National Security Strategy identifies four factors which have identified international terrorism as the facilitated the growth of contemporary most significant immediate security threat terrorist groups: to the UK1. The revised CONTEST strategy, State fragility and failure and published in 20092, sets out the nature unresolved regional disputes and ofthe threat and the Governments conflicts (particularly Palestine, response. While terrorism is not new, the Afghanistan, Bosnia, Chechnya, current threat is different from those we Lebanon, Kashmir and Iraq). have faced before in its scope, capability and ambition. Contemporary international A violent extremist ideology, often terrorist organisations have an associated with Al Qaida, which international cause, plan and conduct regards most governments in Muslim attacks in and from a range of countries majority countries as un-Islamic or and aim to inflict significant civilian apostate; considers the overthrow of casualties. Many seek to recruit people these governments to be the religious inthis country. Some organisations aspire duty of all Muslims; and calls for to use unconventional methods, including attacks on western countries (and chemical, biological, radiological and their citizens) who are perceived to nuclear weapons. offer those governments political, financial or military support. 1.02 The main terrorist threat to the UK Some modern technologies, which comes from four interrelated sources: have been used by terrorist AlQaida; terrorist groups affiliated to organisations, not only to plan and AlQaida; self starting groups and conduct attacks, but also to individuals who identify with the ideology disseminate propaganda and recruit promoted by Al Qaida; and terrorist groups people to their cause. with a broadly similar ideology, but which have their own identity and regional Radicalisation, the process by which agenda. All of these organisations and people actually come to support networks try to claim a religious violent extremism and, in some cases, justification for their actions. to join terrorist groups. 1.03 Since 2001, the UK police and Planning assumptions Security Service have disrupted over a dozen attempted terrorist plots and nearly 1.05 CONTEST outlines the likely 200 people have been successfully direction of the terrorist threat over the prosecuted for terrorist related activity. next three years: On 7 July 2005 four British terrorists Under international pressure the attacked the London transport system, AlQaida organisation is likely to murdering 52 people and injuring fragment and may not survive in its hundreds more. A second planned attack current form. Networks and groups two weeks later was unsuccessful. Since associated with Al Qaida will have 2005 Al Qaida has continued to attempt more autonomy. They will continue to attacks in this country. operate in fragile and failing states. Strategic context

8 Part 1 Terrorists will have access to new technology and, as a result, may Reducing support for terrorism and preventing people becoming terrorists become capable of conducting more are vital: without popular support lethal operations. terrorism is unsustainable. The ideology associated with Al Qaida Our strategy must be responsive to the will outlive changes to its structure. threat that can be created by rapidly evolving technology. The extent to which the international community can reach out to those who We recognise that partnerships in this are vulnerable to radicalisation will country and overseas are essential significantly determine the shape and toour success and that these extent of the future threat. partnerships depend on openness andtrust. As the structure of Al Qaida changes, the terrorist threat in and to the UK The threat we face crosses our may diversify towards smaller self borders and is international in scope. starting organisations. Continued law We will depend upon our allies as they enforcement, security and intelligence will depend on us. work will be needed to contain the threat we face. 1.08 CONTEST is based on four workstreams, each with a clear objective: The ideology which sustains terrorism will be subject to greater challenge by Pursue: to stop terrorist attacks. all communities in this country, making Prevent: to stop people becoming it harder for terrorists to operate here terrorists or supporting violent and to recruit people to their cause. extremism. CONTEST: aim and principles Protect: to strengthen our protection against terrorist attack. 1.06 The aim of CONTEST is: Prepare: where an attack cannot be stopped, to mitigate its impact. to reduce the risk to the United Kingdom and its interests overseas from 1.09 Work on Pursue and Prevent reduces international terrorism, so that people the threat from terrorism while work on cango about their lives freely and with Protect and Prepare reduces the UKs confidence. vulnerability to attack. Together, they reduce the overall risk from international 1.07 CONTEST is based on a set of terrorism. The revised strategy also principles. These reflect our core values, emphasises a number of priorities the lessons we and others have drawn common to all the four main workstreams: from our experiences of terrorism to date, one of these is science and technology. and the broader security principles set out in the 2009 National Security Strategy. CONTEST: science and technology We will continue to regard the protection of human rights as central 1.10 The 2009 National Security to our counter-terrorism work in this Strategy identifies technology as a key country and overseas. driver ofthreats to the UK3. It notes that the exploitation of advances in technology Our response to terrorism is and will byboth terrorists and organised crime be based upon the rule of law. groups will inevitably create challenges We will always aim to prosecute those toour national security. responsible for terrorist attacks in this country. Our strategy will tackle the causes as well as symptoms of terrorism. The United Kingdoms Science and Technology Strategy for Countering International Terrorism

9 Part 1 1.11 CONTEST argues that rapid technological change has had two key services in their work. Technology has provided systems to better protect our effects on terrorism. The communications critical national infrastructure and crowded revolution has made easier the spread of places and has improved detection violent extremist ideology and equipment for explosive and CBRN threats. propaganda and has facilitated More recently, the social and behavioural fundraising, recruitment, training and sciences have provided important insights operational planning. Technology has also into the causes of radicalisation which provided terrorist groups with the means have been essential to the development of to plan operations more securely and to the Prevent strategy. The Guide for Local achieve more lethal effects. We know that Partners on Prevent, published in 2008, some terrorists aspire to develop and use provided more detail on the growing body chemical, biological, radiological and even of knowledge informing our understanding nuclear weapons and that they have tried of radicalisation4. Understanding the to use the internet to locate the materials behaviours of both individuals and crowds and expertise they need. has also formed part of our work to protect crowded places. 1.12 These trends are expected to continue. In the future, terrorists are very CONTEST: governance of science likely to have more scope to communicate andtechnology with each other, sometimes with less chance of detection. Online 1.15 The Office for Security and Counter- communications will continue to enable Terrorism (OSCT) was established in the extremist messages to reach vulnerable Home Office in March 2007. It supports individuals faster than conventional the Home Secretary and other Ministers media. Technology may provide improved in the development, direction, surveillance and reconnaissance implementation and governance of the capability as well as more lethal UKs Counter-Terrorism Strategy weapons. Scientific training and expertise (CONTEST). It also directly delivers those will itself have even greater significance aspects of the counter-terrorism strategy for terrorist (and insurgent) organisations which fall to the Home Office, manages because technology will be able to counter-terrorism related crises through compensate for the vulnerabilities the Cabinet Office Briefing Rooms (COBR), theyhave. facilitates the Home Secretarys statutory oversight of the Security Service and is 1.13 While technology has provided responsible for the programme powerful new tools, techniques and management and direction of the 2012 tactics in support of the terrorist agenda, Olympic and Paralympic Security and it is also a key element in our response. Safety Strategy. Success in delivering relevant science, innovation and technology is vital to the 1.16 OSCT coordinates cross- delivery of CONTEST. Science and Government Science and Technology work technology impacts every area of the in support of counter-terrorism, in close strategy. Our continued ability to identify conjunction with a range of Departments and convict people engaged in terrorism, and agencies, and is responsible for this prevent radicalisation, protect our document. OSCT also chairs the infrastructure and prepare for an attack CONTEST Science and Technology Board, all depend on developments in the which assesses progress on science and physical and social sciences. technology in the four main workstreams of CONTEST and across Departments, 1.14 Traditionally, scientific and agencies and policing. In addition, the technological support to counter-terrorism Government Chief Scientific Adviser sits has been focused on the technical on both the CONTEST board and the sciences. Improved communications and CONTEST Science and Technology board. surveillance systems have helped the law enforcement, security and intelligence Strategic context

10 Part 1 The impact of future technology on counter-terrorism In the preparation of CONTEST, OSCT Knowledge transfer: the growing worked closely with the Ministry of exchange of high-tech knowledge Defence Counter-Terrorism Science and between the developing world and the Technology Centre (MOD CT Centre) to West, the increasing size of the identify science and technology computer-literate workforce in developments likely to impact on developing countries, and efforts by terrorism out to 2020. The full report is global corporations to diversify their classified but the following are key operations, will foster the spread of highlights. new technologies. Knowledge loss: the trend towards In very general terms the report identified employing technology rather than three overarching issues likely to favour human expertise may come at the terrorist organisations in this period: expense of developing human analysis The democratisation of science and and judgement. technology, which puts more Independence and agility: in information and capability in the hands technological development, small of small groups and individuals. groups can often outperform larger The proliferation of technology, which counterparts. State organisations can offers terrorists an increasing choice be constrained by their decision- of weapons. making processes and by security and commercial factors. Moreover, the last The pace of change in many science few years have seen the creation, and technology domains, which may adoption and exploitation of new exceed the speed with which any technologies by an audience of government can respond. amateurs who now far outnumber those in traditional research and These three issues in turn reflect a development roles. number of more specific trends during this period: The report identifies seven broad science Globalisation: new communications and technology domains where future technology is enabling international developments may have a significant outsourcing of high-cost, secondary impact on terrorist activities and our functions to suppliers, service industry counter-terrorism work. These domains and consultants, many of them located and some of the potential developments in other countries. are set out below. The list should not be regarded as comprehensive. Acceleration and convergence: the rate of change in Commercial Off the Information and Communication Shelf Technology (COTS) and open Technology (ICT) source technology is increasing. Future Instantaneous worldwide mobile technology trends will be marked not communications will become available only by accelerating advances in to most people, increasing global individual technologies, but also by information flows. convergence of technologies, (eg information, biological, materials, and There will be an exponential growth in nanotechnologies) with the potential to the volume of data stored on revolutionise our lives. networked computer systems; small The United Kingdoms Science and Technology Strategy for Countering International Terrorism

11 Part 1 and inexpensive devices will store Nanotechnology will allow the massive amounts of data as voice, exploitation of alternative properties of video and text. materials as well as miniaturisation of existing capabilities, which will lead to There is likely to be an increasing enhancements in areas such as trend away from producers pushing protection, communication and information out to the public and detection. towards consumers pulling in only what they want, when they want it. Robotics Robots that effectively mimic human Biotechnology appearance and movements may be The costs of bioengineering will used as human proxies. continue to fall. Robots may increase the performance More genetic data and information and safety of individuals and small about the human genome will be teams by increasingly carrying out publicly available. repetitive or dangerous tasks. Laboratory equipment will automate or facilitate specific bioengineering Engineering and Manufacturing procedures, providing capability to Non-traditional methods of groups which otherwise lack the manufacturing, such as rapid necessary expertise. prototyping and 3D printing, will continue to develop, making available Military Science the production of sophisticated Weapons with greater precision and components to the non-specialist. higher lethality are likely to be more A range of commercially available widely available. technologies will continue to greatly Technical change will facilitate aspects enhance human performance (speed, of chemical and biological weaponry. strength and mental agility etc.) on land and in the water. The ability to make explosives from commonly available ingredients will Materials Science become more widespread. Fabrics will incorporate power sources, electronics and optical fibres; advances Nanotechnology (the understanding and will significantly improve camouflage control of matter at dimensions between and protection and allow clothing to approximately 1 and 100 nanometers)5 monitor an individuals health. Nanotechnology will enable the Composite materials will possess accelerated development of novel greatly enhanced strength, toughness, materials and may be used to facilitate wear and corrosion resistance. the development of possible future explosives and fissile material. The impact of future technology on counter-terrorism

12 The United Kingdoms Science and Technology Strategy for Countering International Terrorism

13 Part 2 The 2009 Science and Technology Strategy 2.01 In 2007 the Government published 2.03 This strategy: its first Science and Innovation Strategy Reflects our recognition that modern for Security and Counter-Terrorism6. technologies, which facilitate terrorist Thissought to optimise the benefits of propaganda, communications and science and innovation to reduce the risk operations, are an important long-term from terrorism so that people can go strategic driver of the terrorist threat. about their business freely and with confidence. The strategy identified four Places greater emphasis on identifying key ways of meeting this aim: horizon science and technology requirements scanning; expanded cross-Departmental from across Government, the police operational analysis leading to clear service and wider law enforcement to research priorities; effective working ensure that the right solutions are withbusiness and academia; and developed to counter the challenges international collaboration. we face. Seeks greater partnership and 2.02 This 2009 strategy builds on the engagement with industry and earlier document. Its aim is to: use academia and commits us to more innovation, science and technology to openness and transparency on reduce the risk to the UK and its interests science, technology and counter- overseas from international terrorism, so terrorism. that people can go about their lives freely and with confidence. It has three 2.04 This strategy also reflects the principal objectives: Home Office Science and Innovation To use horizon scanning to Strategy 2009127. As in that document, understand future scientific and the definition of science used here technical threats and opportunities includes physical sciences and and inform our decision making on engineering, social sciences, statistics, counter-terrorism. economics and operational research. To ensure the development and 2.05 The remainder of this document delivery of effective counter-terrorism outlines the achievements in these areas solutions by identifying and sharing since 2007 and the next steps that we priority science and technology intend to take. It also details the key requirements. challenges that we believe can be To enhance international addressed using science and technology. collaboration on counter-terrorism related science and technology. The 2009 Science and Technology Strategy

14 The United Kingdoms Science and Technology Strategy for Countering International Terrorism

15 Part 3 Delivering the strategy 3.01 This section sets out the strategys Horizons Unit to coordinate Government three main areas of work, outlining security-related horizon scanning work, achievements so far and future action. including in science and technology. This unit works alongside the National Security Horizon scanning Forum8, established in 2009 to provide expertise from people outside of 3.02 Our objective: to use horizon Government on a range of issues relating scanning to understand future scientific to the National Security Strategy. and technical threats and opportunities and inform our decision making on 3.05 The Government Office for Science counter-terrorism. (GO-Science) is responsible for ensuring that Government policy and decision- Key achievements since 2007 making is supported by robust scientific evidence and long-term thinking9. The 3.03 Horizon scanning is vital to our GO-Science Foresight Horizon Scanning counter-terrorist work. We need to Centre (HSC)10 has created the Future understand which existing terrorist groups Security and Intelligence Outlook Network might pose a threat to us in future and (FUSION) which brings together strategic from where new groups might emerge. We futures analysts within the Government also want to anticipate the technologies security and intelligence community. they may use. We need to be aware of the FUSION promotes collaboration on issues technologies which may be available to us that cut across Departmental interests, and plan accordingly. New research and and encourages the use of futures innovative technologies often take time to techniques within Departments and develop, so we need to identify potential Agencies. FUSION complements the threats and opportunities as early as HSCs Futures Analysts Network (FAN) possible. The paper on pages 10 and 11 Club, which is open to all inside and above, is an example of collaborative outside Government from the UK and horizon scanning between OSCT and MOD. overseas. Both networks enable the exchange of new ideas, innovative 3.04 Since its formation in 2003 the thinking and good practice. Joint Terrorist Analysis Centre (JTAC), theUK centre for the analysis and 3.06 The HSCs Sigma Scan11, first assessment of the threat from terrorism, published in 2006, has been expanded has grown by 60%. Part of the role of and updated in the past three years. It JTAC is to assess the current and future comprises a set of almost 300 papers, technological capabilities of terrorist including over 100 involving science and organisations and this work has played technology. They explore potential future an important part in shaping our overall trends across the entire public policy counter-terrorism strategy. JTAC works spectrum and are drawn from more than closely with the Cabinet Office 2000 sources and interviews with 300 Assessments Staff who produce papers leading thinkers. The Scan looks up to 50 for consideration and approval by the years forward and provides a tool to help Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC). The Government identify future risks and JICalso considers future scientific and opportunities. technical issues likely to impact on our wider national security. In 2008 the Cabinet Office set up the Strategic Delivering the strategy

16 Part 3 Next steps 3.12 The market for counter-terrorism science and technology is more 3.07 OSCT will carry out horizon scanning fragmented than many others, especially projects based on the conclusions of the in comparison to the Defence market. OSCT/MOD scan to 2020, to identify This reflects the range of Departments, triggers and trends for critical areas. We Agencies, Police forces and local delivery will use the conclusions of these scans to partners involved in this work, as well as adapt or develop science and technology the broad range of requirements policy and make them available across stemming from the CONTEST strategy. the counter-terrorism community. Aligning these interests and developing coordinated engagement is a high priority. 3.08 OSCT will also carry out a new long-term scan within the three-year 3.13 Getting this right in the domestic period to take account of important counter-terrorism market will also help scientific and technological changes. The tostimulate an international market in results of this scan will inform the future security products for UK industry and development of the counter-terrorism academia. We are committed to allowing science and technology strategy. as strong a market as possible to develop in these areas, within appropriate export 3.09 OSCT will engage with cross- controls. Government horizon scanning efforts on science and technology, ensuring our own 3.14 Testing, validation and verification work is widely distributed and used and of potential technological solutions is the that we are making use of relevant work responsibility of the Home Office elsewhere, notably in the Strategic Scientific Development Branch (HOSDB)12, Horizons Unit and the Joint Intelligence the Centre for the Protection of National Committee (JIC). Infrastructure (CPNI)13, the Ministry of Defence Counter-Terrorism Science and Identifying and sharing requirements; Technology Centre (MOD CT Centre)14 and delivering effective solutions the Transport Research Laboratories15. The Home Office Scientific Development 3.10 Our objective: to ensure the Branch (HOSDB) Exhibition is an annual development and delivery of effective showcase for the latest security and counter-terrorism solutions by identifying counter-terrorism equipment. and sharing priority science and technology requirements. Key achievements since 2007 3.11 Understanding and prioritising the 3.15 The establishment of OSCT in science and technology requirements of 2007has led to closer collaboration on the UK counter-terrorism community and requirements setting across Departments sharing these requirements with industry engaged in CONTEST. Policy leads, end- and academia are at the heart of this users (including the police, security and strategy. Both industry and academia have intelligence services) and scientific experts a significant role to play in countering have worked together to identify cross- terrorism in the UK. The UK is a leading Government research and technological innovator in the design and provision of priorities under each of the CONTEST work defence and security solutions and we streams, embracing both technical and want this expertise applied to science and social science. The Governments Chief technology in the counter-terrorism Scientific Adviser has set up a panel of domain. Government is already working Departmental Chief Scientific Advisers to with industry primes, small and medium review counter-terrorism issues. sized enterprises (SMEs) and academia to ensure that providers know what is needed and understand the route to market. The United Kingdoms Science and Technology Strategy for Countering International Terrorism

17 Part 3 3.16 Research into methods of dealing with non-conventional chemical, 3.19 Although not formally part of CONTEST, counter-insurgency is closely biological, radiological and nuclear linked to our work to reduce the threat to attacks by terrorists has been a major the UK and its interests from international priority in the past five years. In 2004 terrorism. Counter-insurgency requirements theGovernment established a cross- and solutions are often applicable in department science and technology counter-terrorism. For example, the Ministry programme to strengthen the UKs ability of Defence counter-terrorism science and to respond to a CBRN attack. The technology programme has delivered programme now has a budget of more enhanced capability to front-line troops than 10 million a year and has expanded conducting counter-insurgency operations to include more than 50 projects, in Afghanistan and Iraq. A new explosives supporting all four key CONTEST detection capability has been deployed workstreams. A cross-Government board inthese areas, providing a step change in sets the programmes research priorities capability for the detection of a range of and the research is quality assured by an explosive and chemical threats. MOD is independent, external scientific advisory also working closely with UK industry board. The programme has delivered new onthe detection of improvised explosive guidance and equipment, modelling tools, devices. Small-scale trials conducted risk reduction, medical countermeasures in2009 have identified promising and has quality assured commercial technologies and systems, which will off-the-shelf products. berapidly developed into full trials. 3.17 In 2007 the Government began 3.20 In March 2007, the Security and todevelop a revised Prevent strategy for Resilience Industry Suppliers Community stopping people becoming or supporting (RISC)18 was formed to provide a focal terrorism. The strategy was based on an point for Government to liaise with improved understanding of the causes or industry on counter-terrorism radicalisation in this country and overseas, requirements. Through RISC, five joint which in turn reflected the increase in Industry Advisory Groups have been credible research and analysis in this area. established in areas of particular Some of this research was conducted importance to this strategy: within Government Departments, but some Chemical, Biological, Radiological and was commissioned externally. For example, Nuclear (CBRN) the Association of Chief Police Officers Terrorism and Allied Matters business area The Critical National Infrastructure (CNI) (ACPO/TAM)16 commissioned the report Information and Communications Hearts and minds and eyes and ears: Technology (ICT) Reducing radicalisation risks through reassurance-oriented policing through their Detecting suicide bombers Research & Innovation Unit (RIU). The RIU Olympics feeds front-line user requirements into ACPO/TAM and facilitates research 3.21 The purpose of these five groups collaboration between the Police Service, isto exploit Government-funded research, Home Office and Security Service through develop Government requirements, focus an Interagency Co-ordinating Group. private sector investment and enable access to innovation. 3.18 A cross-Government Social Science Academic Advisory Board now coordinates and supports social science work under the Prevent workstream. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) is responsible for a significant Prevent research programme on a range of overseas topics run by the Economic and Social Research Council17. Delivering the strategy

18 Part 3 3.22 RISC completed two reviews on behalf of Government during 2008. The The IDEAS factory first gave an outline of the UKs world The Engineering and Physical Sciences class security capabilities and identified Research Council (EPSRC)24 has areas where new security capabilities are devised a unique way of bringing being developed by industry. The second together organisations with technical review informed Government about the challenges and academics with current challenges, opportunities and relevant skills to enable the realities of dealing with Departments development of research solutions. andagencies on counter-terrorism from an industry perspective. Their EPSRC invites academics to IDEAS recommendations are being implemented factory events via the Research in cooperation with RISC. Council websites with the incentive that funding is allocated to research 3.23 OSCT has also investigated the use proposals that come out of the of venture capital-style techniques process. About 25 people work toencourage innovation in the counter- together on a challenge, for about a terrorism arena. This included using week. The Centre for the Protection of regional searches, competitions and the National Infrastructure (CPNI) has investor networks to access innovative run two of these events, including work ideas to protect crowded places and on public behaviour in public spaces. developments in Information and This has facilitated contacts with a Communication Technology (ICT). The wide range of academics and, findings were used to inform the approach subsequently, six new counter- used in the new innovation programme, terrorism research projects. INSTINCT19. RISC The UK Security and Resilience Industry Suppliers Community (RISC) provides a focal point for the Government to communicate with industry about its counter-terrorism needs. RISC is an alliance of suppliers, trade associations and academics, and includes over 2,000 companies ranging from prime contractors and global leaders through to small and medium enterprises and start-ups. The trade associations are: the Societyof British Aerospace Companies (SBAC)20, the Defence Manufacturers Association (DMA, including the Association of Police and Public Security Suppliers APPSS21), the British Security Industry Association (BSIA)22, and Intellect (theUK trade association for the technology industry)23. The United Kingdoms Science and Technology Strategy for Countering International Terrorism

19 Part 3 INSTINCT (Innovative Science and Next steps 3.24 OSCT will use a scenario-based Technology in Counter-Terrorism) approach to identify where and how INSTINCT is a cross-Government science and technology can improve the programme led by OSCT that seeks UKs counter-terrorism capability. Experts, innovative solutions to support our policy makers and front-line staff will counter-terrorism strategy. Its aim is to participate in the process. Subject enable Government to make the most experts will be included in a counter- of innovative projects and ideas in terrorism science and technology advisory counter-terrorism by providing a greater group which will report to the National understanding of the innovation Security Forum. Front-line expertise will community, smarter influence over be drawn from the police, security and external innovation and better intelligence services. OSCT will also use coordination of investments in new organisational learning, operational ideas and solutions. Organisations reviews and the results of inspection involved in INSTINCT include OSCT, the activity to inform conclusions. Home Office Scientific Development Branch (HOSDB), the Ministry of 3.25 Science commissioned by Defence, the Centre for the Protection Government through the CONTEST of National Infrastructure (CPNI) and Science & Technology Programme will be the Association for Chief Police subject to independent academic review. Officers (ACPO). The counter-terrorism science and technology advisory group (see 3.24) The INSTINCT programme will include willpropose a panel of security-cleared calls for proposals on a variety of academics for this purpose. topics relevant to counter-terrorism. The first of these was an industry day 3.26 OSCT will produce a series of that focused on Intent in Crowded brochures for industry and academia Places held in collaboration with the outlining counter-terrorism related science Ministry of Defences Centre for and technology requirements and possible Defence Enterprise (CDE)25. The CDE exploitation routes. The first of these isthe first point of contact for anyone brochures, published alongside this with a disruptive technology, new strategy, outlines four challenges where process or innovation that has a new developments could significantly potential defence application. This enhance counter-terrorism work. These are event was the first time the CDE had summarised in Part 4 of this document. been used to address a (non-MOD) The brochure also explains in more detail counter-terrorism challenge. how industry and academia can get involved in this counter-terrorism work26. Later brochures in this series will deal with a variety of priority and emerging topics, including social sciences in counter- terrorism. 3.27 Government will undertake a programme of engagement beyond the security and intelligence sphere to include industries not normally associated with counter-terrorism. Delivering the strategy

20 Part 3 3.28 Government will continue to work with Research Councils UK (RCUK)27 to The Interception Modernisation Programme improve the Governments engagement with academia, Research Councils and Governed by strict rules, data about public sector research establishments communications services is routinely incounter-terrorism. It will also continue used to investigate terrorist plots, to encourage innovation through the convict those guilty of serious crimes, Technology Strategy Board28. seize illegal drugs and protect the vulnerable inour society. However, the 3.29 Government will use the highly competitive and innovative INSTINCTprogramme to enable greater communications environment in the understanding of the innovation UKhas led to rapid changes in how community, smarter influence over communications technologies are external innovation and better provided and used. New ways of coordination of investments in communicating are becoming available, innovativeideas and solutions. for example using VOIP (Voice Over Internet Protocol) and other internet- 3.30 OSCT will work with Government based services. These changes have Departments and agencies to improve implications for how communications the efficiency of the market place and data is collected and the extent to coordinate our counter-terrorist which public authorities are able to requirements. Given the range of lawfully obtain it. interests involved (over 50 police forces across the UK, more than 30 Government The cross-Government Interception departments and agencies and the Modernisation Programme (IMP) is Devolved Administrations) it is neither concerned with maintaining our capability feasible nor desirable to create a single to use communications data in the face market. However, the Home Office will be of the challenges posed by new working with key sectors and in particular, communications technologies. The with the National Police Improvement programme has been researching the Agency (NPIA)29 and the Association of challenges caused by advances in Chief Police Officers (ACPO) to establish technology and the impact of any amore coordinated approach to the potential capability gaps. IMP is one of purchase of counter-terrorism equipment the most important and urgent examples by police forces. of Government identifying a requirement and sharing that requirement with industry and many others. A recent public consultation proposed possible solutions on how we continue to collect, access and safeguard this important data to protect the public in the future30. The United Kingdoms Science and Technology Strategy for Countering International Terrorism

21 Part 3 International collaboration 3.34 The UK Government is also represented on the European Security 3.31 Our objective: to enhance Research and Innovation Forum (ESRIF)32, international collaboration on counter- which will shortly present its report to terrorism related science and technology. theEuropean Commission on counter- terrorism, mid- to long-term requirements 3.32 International collaboration is the for security research and innovation (up to cornerstone of all our counter-terrorist 20 years ahead). work. Terrorist incidents here usually have an international connection; international 3.35 The UK has played a role in shaping terrorist networks threaten the UKs the EU CBRN Action Plan33 through interests overseas and people from this expert-level participation in the preceding country have participated in attacks and scoping exercise (the CBRN Task Force) insurgencies in other countries. An and by close engagement with the EU international response is vital to the Commission. The recently published Plan success of CONTEST. Agencies in the UK aims to support the ongoing efforts of the collaborate closely with their counterparts Member States and provides a framework overseas. We work with other countries for better cooperation. This is one of the and with multilateral organisations to Commissions priorities on counter- develop policy responses to the threats terrorism for the coming years and is a we each face. We also need to coordinate substantial dossier for the current closely with like-minded overseas Swedish Presidency. Work on the Action partners in developing and sharing Plan is being coordinated within the EU science and technology relevant to our Commission by the Directorate-General counter-terrorism work. for Justice, Freedom and Security (DG JLS) and is built around three strategic Key achievements since 2007 themes: 3.33 In the past two years we have Prevention reducing unauthorised continued to strengthen our relationships access to CBRN materials. with international partners. In Europe, ourmain engagement on science and Detection improving the capability technology for counter-terrorism has been todetect CBRN materials. through the European Union and the Preparedness and Response European Commissions Framework improving the speed and effectiveness Programme 7 (FP7)31. One of the ten of our response to and recovery from FP7themes is Security, which includes CBRN events. counter-terrorism. Under FP7, the European Commission awards research 3.36 The Plan is undergoing a further funding to investigate a range of security round of consultation within EU Member questions. FP7 encourages collaboration States and discussion at the Civil between industry, including small and Protection Working Group before final medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), adoption by the EU Council in December academia, public sector research 2009. It should facilitate access to EU establishments, and international research funding by clarifying priorities and partners. The UK is actively engaged linking into other programmes. For example, inthe process to set the FP7 Security there are plans for DG JLS to allocate up to programme of research requirements. 100 million from existing financial The FP7 Security programme budget programmes to support implementation of for2009 was 117 million, rising to the plan over the period 20102013. Other over200 million in 2010. UK projects Commission funding programmes such as currently funded by FP7 are ongoing and FP7 will also contribute. If successfully will deliver in the next few years. They implemented, the Plan should coordinate include work on physical security, crisis activity on CBRN across a number of EU management simulation and training, areas (health, environment etc), assist with andsupply chain security. identifying overlaps and reduce the potential for duplication of effort. Delivering the strategy

22 Part 3 3.37 OSCT is developing a working relationship with the CBRNE Centre based interoperability and spread good practice in both countries. at the University of Ume in Sweden34, established in 2008 to be a European 3.41 The MOD Counter-Terriorism Science centre of excellence in CBRNE research and Technology Centre is collaborating and training. Amongst its current work, with the Australian Counter-Terrorism and theCentre is leading a consortium of Security Technology Centre, which acts academia, industry and end-users to asa focal point for counter-terrorism and bidfor a major EU project under FP7 to security science and technology advice, determine baseline CBRNE requirements support and solutions across Australias for Europe: the UK is involved as a agencies. potential end-user via the Police National CBRN Centre which coordinates police 3.42 Led by CPNI, the UK has also signed work in this area. a new Memorandum of Understanding with Canada covering the use of Science and 3.38 The UK has collaborated closely with Technology in Public Security and Safety. EU partners to take forward the work of This agreement will allow us to share the Enhancing the Security of Explosives existing knowledge and experience, action plan35 (published in November develop new joint programmes of work, 2007) which recommended steps to and share personnel. The MoU covers control precursor chemicals and improve arange of themes including information the storage, transport and audit of management and security, assessment explosives and explosive detection ofrisk, informing policy with science capabilities. andtechnology, and CBRNE. 3.39 The Government has a very wide 3.43 The UK is also heavily involved ranging scientific and technical dialogue ininternational social science research oncounter-terrorism related issues with relating to the Prevent stream of the US, notably the Department for CONTEST, sharing and receiving data in Homeland Security (DHS)36 and the arange ofbilateral and multilateral fora. Department of Defense. Joint work is UK Government social and behavioural taking place in particularly complex areas, scientists are in close contact with their including detection and identification of counterparts in the Human Factors CBRNE material, and the longer-term Division of the Department of Homeland recovery from CBRN attack. The UK has Security and are linked into the DHS- benefited from the USs experience in the sponsored Studies in Terrorism and clean-up and management of Responses to Terrorism (START) contamination resulting from the anthrax researchprogramme at the University of letters in 2001. Information-sharing and Maryland37. Collaboration has included collaboration between the Home Office joint academic workshops on and the Department of Homeland Security radicalisation, sponsoring research has led to the Biological Autonomous onradicalisation in prisons and joint Networked Detector Project (BAND) to seminars on the internet. In Europe, UK jointly trial a prototype biological detection social scientists are actively exchanging system. Theresults will inform future research ideas through the European improvements in the UKs resilience to Network of Experts in Radicalisation run terrorist attacks with biological weapons. by the European Commission through theChange Institute in London38. 3.40 The Ministry of Defence collaborates UKscientists are also involved in the closely with the US Department of Defense radicalisation working group of the and other US Government departments. European Security Research and Through a Memorandum of Understanding Innovation Forum, and in expert (MoU) the UK and US have shared practitioners groups set up by the standards and protocols relating to EUCTCoordinator. imaging, intruder detection systems andsoftware. This has enhanced The United Kingdoms Science and Technology Strategy for Countering International Terrorism

23 Part 3 Next steps 3.44 We will work with our international partners to identify areas of best practice and expertise. Our work with the US and the EU will continue to be the most significant but we will look to address our requirements wherever we believe a shared approach to counter-terrorism science and technology would be productive. We will build on the FP7 and ESRIF work by identifying and engaging with other multilateral organisations to facilitate international opportunities for UK industry and academia. Collaboration on social science will remain a high priority. This work will be covered in more detail in a future brochure. Delivering the strategy

24 The United Kingdoms Science and Technology Strategy for Countering International Terrorism

25 Part 4 Key challenges in counter-terrorism 4.01 The latest version of the and psychological factors, and how and Governments counter-terrorism strategy, when these operate in individuals or CONTEST, explicitly identifies a number of groups. This will better enable us to future challenges that we shall face in develop the most effective counter- implementing the strategy successfully radicalisation policies and measure over the next three years39. The theimpact of existing and future challenges are set out in relation to each Government programmes. of the four main workstreams (ie Pursue, Prevent, Protect and Prepare) and in Protecting the national infrastructure connection with our management of the 4.04 The national infrastructure delivers threat from terrorist use of chemical, essential services to the public (such biological, radiological and nuclear aspower, water, transport, finance and weapons and explosives. Addressing healthcare). Damage to this infrastructure these challenges will require significant can have severe economic impact or scientific and technological inputs. cause large-scale loss of life. Intelligence shows that terrorists are interested in 4.02 This section sets out seven attacking national infrastructure targets challenges. Some of these, along and recognise the potential impact such withsome of the related science and attacks can have. The Government will technology areas* are explained in wish to maintain appropriate measures moredetail in the first of a series of for detection and protection. brochures26 which is published alongside this document**. Reducing the vulnerability of crowdedplaces Understanding the causes of radicalisation 4.05 Crowded places are attractive terrorist targets. Their protection presents 4.03 Radicalisation (the process by significant challenges as threats can which people come to support violent bedifficult to detect and deter, extremism and terrorism and, in some particularly without impeding the ability cases, then to participate in terrorist ofthe public to go about their normal groups) is one of the four drivers of the dayto day business. terrorist threat we face today. We need tocontinue to improve our understanding Protecting against cyber terrorism of the causes of radicalisation in this country and overseas. Whilst there is 4.06 The UK is increasingly reliant on agrowing body of research relating to networked communication, but the very theprocess of radicalisation to violent open nature of our digital infrastructure extremism, more must be done to makes it vulnerable to attack. In improve the evidence base and develop response to this the Government has robust models. In particular, we need to recently published the first Cyber Security improve our understanding of the relative Strategy for the United Kingdom40, which importance of political, ideological, social sets out the UKs strategic cyber security objectives and incorporates a cyber * These areas are: knowledge management, biometrics, security industrial strategy. In the next screening, physical protection and countering improvised explosive devices. three years we continue to expect terrorist groups to favour high-profile **The challenges included in the brochure are: protecting the national infrastructure; reducing the vulnerability of crowded conventional or unconventional places; protecting against cyber terrorism; and improving operations over cyber attacks, but we analytical tools Key challenges in counter-terrorism

26 Part 4 must be vigilant against any increase incapability or change in intent. We Understanding and countering Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and willcontinue to require ways to protect Explosive threats (CBRNE) ourselves from an attack and ways of 4.11 The CBRNE threat (chemical, recovering quickly should such an biological, radiological and nuclear attackoccur. weapons and explosives) from terrorists is complex and poses significant Improving analytical tools challenges. In addition to a deeper 4.07 Terrorists operate in secret. understanding of how the threat is Detecting their activities requires the evolving and how we can disrupt it, we ability to exploit new data analysis require measures to protect ourselves andinformation sharing methods, and respond effectively in the event of a sophisticated technical collection and CBRNE attack. This includes improved exploitation systems, and the very latest detection, identification and counter- means of information sharing and measures. Looking to the future, Al Qaida management. and other terrorist organisations may be developing new technologies to use in an 4.08 One of the major challenges is attack and we must keep ahead of this todevelop new methods of identifying evolving threat. patterns or trends from large quantities of raw data that could alert us to suspicious activity. 4.09 Because surveillance, interception and the collection of data have the potential to intrude on privacy, it is vital that there are strict rules governing the use of these techniques and strong independent oversight of how these rulesare applied. Identifying, detecting and countering novel and improvised explosives 4.10 Many contemporary terrorist groups have demonstrated an intent to experiment with novel explosives to maximise the lethal capability and, in some cases, deliberately evade protective security measures. We need to constantly update and improve understanding of and ability to detect explosive compounds of all kinds, while reducing disruption and inconvenience to the travelling public. We also need methods to render improvised explosive devices safeshould they be detected. The United Kingdoms Science and Technology Strategy for Countering International Terrorism

27 Key challenges in counter-terrorism

28 Case studies Aesthetic barriers deployed in central London The United Kingdoms Science and Technology Strategy for Countering International Terrorism

29 Barriers: Improving transport effective physical security protection with minimal architectural impact Security systems such as passenger screening at Barriers already have a well- airports are complex, typically established role in protecting involving multiple channels, important targets from vehicle different detectors and born explosives. The Centre numerous processes, which for the Protection of National work together in complex Infrastructure (CPNI) is the ways. The Department for Government authority in this Transport (DfT)41 has created area, providing security advice innovative computer software to the businesses and that allows the modelling and organisations responsible for testing of these complex essential services. CPNI has security systems to make worked closely with industry transport safer. todevelop barriers that are One of the challenges DfT faces is to highly resistant to impact. understand how changing any aspect of a security system will affect its performance, Barriers are also being developed which particularly when changes may affect provide protection with minimum queues and waiting times. With help from architectural impact and require minimal the Defence Science and Technology excavation during installation. One Laboratory (Dstl)42, DfT has used example is the CPNI-tested protective operational analysis a branch of balustrades and walls in Whitehall, which mathematics todevelop software that were designed by the City Council to can simulate changes to a systems design reflectthe listed buildings in the area. and measure the effect on performance. The effects of these changes can now be predicted before putting them into practice in the real world. The model has been used to provide advice to Eurostar on the design of passenger screening systems at St Pancras International and to analyse the impact on passenger flow of relaxing the hand luggage restrictions at UK airports. Barriers: Case studies effective physical protection with minimal architectural impact Page 29

30 Case studies Home Office Scientific Development Branch testing equipment for stopping rogue vessels The United Kingdoms Science and Technology Strategy for Countering International Terrorism

31 Stopping rogue vessels: Detecting the illicit developing an effective movement of radioactive defence against maritime materials attacks Some terrorist organisations For some time, police have aspire to use unconventional been able to stop suspect or weapons, including nuclear fugitive vehicles on the road. or radiological materials. The Home Office Scientific Innovative systems designed Development Branch to detect the radiation from (HOSDB) has collaborated such materials are being with industry to develop a installed across the UK. new defensive system Programme Cyclamen44 is designed to stop terrorists introducing fixed portals and orcriminals in small boats mobile detection units to without resorting to lethal entry points to detect the force. The system works illicit movement ofnuclear bydisabling the propulsion orradioactive materials into system of a small vessel. theUK. HOSDB has built on its good industrial The system screens freight and people in relationships with the companies working vehicles or on foot as they pass through in this area to develop a practical solution the fixed portals or the Mobile Radiation that meets the Governments needs. Detection Units (MRDUs). These monitors Ittrialled systems and fed back results have the advantage of detecting radiation toindustry for further development. In emitted by radioactive materials in a parallel, the Smith Institute43 reviewed passive manner. Unlike X-ray machines, HOSDBs experiments to ensure the they do not emit any rays, but detect development of good-quality science, radiation only by receiving it. As a result, aswell as enhanced operational the system is not harmful to either the capabilityforthe police. load being screened, or people in the immediate area. We have already successfully piloted fixed radiation portals, which are now being installed across the UK, and the fleet of MRDUs is fully operational.

32 Conclusion International terrorism is a threat to the security of the UK andto our interests overseas. The use of technology by terrorist groups is a feature of the threat we face. CONTEST sets out the programmes which Government has developed to address this threat and some of the challenges which remain. Science and technology have an important partto play in responding to these challenges now and in thefuture. The Government is committed to sharing counter-terrorist science and technology requirements and engaging with industry and academia. This strategy and subsequent publications will indicate how we intend to do that in the future, building on thevery significant progress that has beenmade in the past three years. The United Kingdoms Science and Technology Strategy for Countering International Terrorism

33 End notes 1. 30. communications-data 2. 31. 3. Page 40, nss2009v2.pdf 32. 4. The Prevent Strategy: A Guide for Local Partners in England; 33. pdf search/prevent-strategy 34. 5. 35. 6. search/general/science-innovation-strategy1?view=Binary 36. 7. 37. 8. 38. content&task=view&id=83 9. 39. Pages 78, 99, 116/7, 124/5, 131, 10. uk/counter-terrorism-strategy 11. 40. 12. 41. 13. 42. 14. 43. 15. 44. screening1 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. Countering the terrorist threat: Ideas and Innovation. How industry and academia can play their part. HM Government, August 2009, ISBN 978-1-84726-940-9 27. 28. 29. End notes

34 Published by the Home Office, August 2009 ISBN: 978-1-84726-938-6 Crown copyright

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